Optimal Commodity Taxation
Previous section discussed changing commodity taxes to reduce excess burden (i.e., making consumers better off), but assumed there were lump-sum taxes to keep revenue constant This section will assume we don't have lump-sum taxes; we'll solve a general equilibrium model that gives us "bonus" answers:
(1) How should government evaluate operations of its activities when lump-sum taxation is infeasible (2) How should taxation that's used affect governments operating decisions (3) How to levy taxes for 2nd best outcome (i.e., lump-sum taxes not available) Goal -maximize social welfare subject to revenue and production constraints; decision variables include taxes and public production Public Production -government can buy finished goods for public consumption or can produce goods itself; that means government buys output and sells output; since it's producing it is competing with private sector for factors of production Areas -we're combining taxation, public production and welfare economics (and GE) Consumer Budget Constraintq x q ⋅ = ⋅ˆ (value of consumption = value of endowment); problem is we don't see consumption, just net trades ( x ):
x ¡ x= + Sub this into the budget constraint:
(This allows us to suppress income when we go to multiple consumers) Want to end up with economy of many consumers with public and private production; want to compare different tax systems; want to determine types/amount of public consumption Training Wheels -we'll start with single consumer, no public consumption (but no private production; all public production), and only use commodity taxes; 1 consumer and 2 goods (1 = labor; 2 = consumption good) Weird GraphsDefine origin as "no net trades" (i.e., consumer keeps his endowment) Assume free disposal (any point below the PPF is feasible) Consumer sells labor which is used for production Problems -special cases don't have convex feasible regions, but are realistic so we won't assume them away Fixed Cost -PPF doesn't cross origin, but origin is feasible Increasing Returns -reason for natural monopolies Other Assumptions --No Lump-Sum Tax -government can't tax endowments -Uniform Prices -government can only trade with consumer in market -Price Consumption Curve -all trades government makes with consumer lie on consumer's offer curve: tangencies of consumer budget line and indifference curves); all budget lines go through origin (endowment); moving along offer curve away from origin means consumer is better off Two Constraints -government chooses point on offer curve lying in (on) PPF
More Than Two Goods
Consumer Demands - (i.e., demand = supply) Individualistic -if government's concern is social welfare and SW is individualistic (based on consumer utility), then
increases; government's objective essentially becomes maximizing consumer's utility; solution is last intersection between offer curve and boundary of PPF ∴ we get production efficiency (trivial result for this economy)
Add Private Production
Private Sector -constant returns to scale Public Sector -government runs any industry with increasing returns or fixed costs Decreasing Returns -assume we have none
, where α is marginal utility of income to society Production Efficiency -we assumed private production is efficient and public production is efficient, but we didn't say anything about them being jointly efficient (i.e.,
, but now it becomes z y q x + = ) ( (market clearing; demand = supply) Walras' Law -since we have market clearing, if we know 1 − n markets clear, we know all n markets clear because all agents must satisfy budget constraints Reverse -we showed all n markets clear ∴ if we know all but one agent satisfy their budget constraints, then they all do (so we can delete one budget constraint); in this case, we'll delete the government's budget constraint:
Normalizing -we get to do two of them because we have 
is consumer demand (solution to the consumer maximization problem on top of page 2); we can't do the same for y because of constant returns to scale ( ) (p y would be unbounded), but we can play with the constraints to simplify the problem Price Vector -p only enters in constraint (ii) so if we can drop this constraint, we don't have to worry about p (for now) -First step is to use the market clearing condition (constraint (i)): 
we found in the first step:
Note 2: we're using = constraint (not ≤) so we need to make sure second order conditions hold Result -with aggregate production efficiency, we can't reallocate y or z to produce more or produce same amount more efficiently Graphs -we assumed production efficiency for private sector and public sector; that means each sector is operating on the frontier of it's PPF; for aggregate production efficiency, they're at points on their PPF that have the same slope
Interpretations -3 ways to look at aggregate production efficiency (1) No Intermediate Goods Tax -if we disaggregate private production sector we need a price vector for each sector so we couldn't use ) (p y like we did, but aggregate production efficiency means all price vectors should be equal; that means business to business transactions are untaxed TransactionsBusiness to business untaxed for aggregate production efficiency Business to consumer Business to government untaxed for aggregate production efficiency Consumer to government Consumer to consumer untaxed (both face same prices, q ) Note: this implies government charges different price to consumers and businesses; other models don't allow this so they don't end up with aggregate production efficiency Don't Need Intermediate Tax -choosing q ties down ) (q x so we don't need an intermediate tax to control consumption (2) Untaxable Sectors -subsistence agriculture (people who grow own food and eat it) or household production (home schooling, laundry, cooking, etc.) all gets lumped into consumer sector, but this model is focused on transactions (net trades), not final consumption so these activities are not taxed (3) Const-Benefit Analysis -don't have to confine interpretation to static model;
Arrow & Debrew view it as dynamic (just relabel commodity name for time periods); have to worry about discount rate Tax on Interest Income -consumer sees ) 1 ( t r − and producer sees r ; Aggregate production efficiency says government project should use producer discount rate
Interior Solution -what's required to guarantee 0 ≠ (i.e., we have aggregate production efficiency)? Look at in terms of many consumer economy so rather than using 
.. which is not based on utilities Individual Consumer -showed production will be at last intersection of offer curve and PPF so we know 0 ≠ (see top of page 2)
Multiple Consumers -change in prices can bring gains to some consumers and losses to others (based on consumption possibilities) ∴ we're not guaranteed to have an optimum that has aggregate production efficiency (i.e., could have
Guarantee Improvement -want to find conditions under which q ∆ makes everyone better off so we'll have 0 ≠ (aggregate production efficiency) Assume... individualistic SWF:
for some h (i.e., some consumers are net sellers of good j and others don't trade good j ); could
for some h (i.e., some consumers are net buyers of good j and others don't trade good j ); important thing is to have all consumers on same side of market for one good Sub individual's indirect utility functions into SWF:
How does price change affect social welfare? Take derivative: 
, if all consumers are on same side of market for some good, we can make all consumers better off (hence raise social welfare) by changing price ∴ everyone is made better off by moving to the last intersection of aggregate offer curve and PPF (i.e. aggregate production efficiency) Labor -we assume this condition holds for labor (all consumers are suppliers); but this doesn't work if we categorize labor (e.g., high and low skill) 
(comes from private producer max profit; top of p.3)
Since good 1 is numeraire
; gov't sets both p and q so
Derivative is linear operator so:
Go back to tax: For one consumer case
That says marginal tax revenue wrt k t (tax on good k ) is proportional to consumer's consumption of good k (3) These Also Hold for Numeraire (Good 1)
The previous rules were for n k , , 2 = , but they also hold for proportional to the amount demanded, but there are a variety of interpretations based on the specific demand structure (e.g., taxes, after tax prices, etc.) and is "usually messy"; quantities (regular demands) are distorted by the tax anyway so it's easier to use the Ramsey Rule Income Elasticity -from the right side, we can see that English -optimal tax rates (based on consumer prices) follow the same order as compensated demand elasticities (between the good and the numeraire) Assume
(i.e., good 1 is labor which consumer sells to buy goods 2 and 3); the optimal tax rate is higher on the good that is more complementary to leisure ( 1 x )... i.e., tax rates are not proportional to amount consumed ) and 
So all goods (except numeraire) are taxed at the same rate; the tax is proportional (7b) Inverse Elasticity Rule -if Pull out the k th term:
Multiply both sides by 
Multiply both sides by
Constant elasticity of demand results from Cobb-Douglas preferences Demand Restriction -doesn't make sense that 
which agrees with rule 7a that tax rate is constant across all goods Private Production -so fare we only considered having constant returns in private production sector; anything with increasing returns was put in government sector (to avoid regulation issue); we ignored decreasing returns; adding that to the private sector could result in profits Profit Tax -if there's a 100% profits tax (on pure profit, not counting return to capital), the same optimal tax results go through < 100% -papers by Munk; profits get returned to consumers in closed GE model so it changes the budget constraint:
(where τ is the profits tax rate) Problem -in work above, we claimed q and p were independent (so we could do 2 normalizations); if 0 = ⋅ y p (no profit like we assumed above) or
there's no problem, but otherwise we'll have q and p not independent Consumer Demands -
... depends on both consumer and producer prices; only get homogeneity of degree zero if we change q and p together Solution-set 1 p so 0 = I (effectively a 100% profits tax)... this is not possible if there is some good that is not taxed Complexities -need to worry about demand effects of taxes and producer responses (supply curves); Munk, Stiglitz, and Dasgupta cover "a lot of gory detail" Other Restrictions -other types of tax restrictions covered by Munk, Stiglitz, and Dasgupta; "no clean results"
Multiconsumer Economy -all previous work used a 1 consumer economy; could model with multiple consumer by using indirect utility in social welfare function: 
Tricks:
Normalizations - ; in this case, we can't combine terms; end up with MRT = weighted sum of MRS + "external gain" from public good (i.e., additional commodity taxes raised) Sum of social gain from public good Sum of social gain from private good (income)
